Sprobes: Enforcing Kernel Code Integrity on the TrustZone Architecture

TL;DR

This paper introduces SPROBES, a novel primitive leveraging ARM TrustZone hardware to enforce kernel code integrity and enable OS introspection on smartphones, addressing rootkit threats without full virtualization support.

Contribution

The paper presents SPROBES, a new mechanism that enforces kernel code integrity on TrustZone-enabled devices, allowing effective OS introspection despite hardware limitations.

Findings

SPROBES can enforce five invariants to restrict rootkit actions.

Implementation in Linux kernel 2.6.38 shows only 12 SPROBES are needed.

SPROBES enables comprehensive control of kernel execution on TrustZone.

Abstract

Many smartphones now deploy conventional operating systems, so the rootkit attacks so prevalent on desktop and server systems are now a threat to smartphones. While researchers have advocated using virtualization to detect and prevent attacks on operating systems (e.g., VM introspection and trusted virtual domains), virtualization is not practical on smartphone systems due to the lack of virtualization support and/or the expense of virtualization. Current smartphone processors do have hardware support for running a protected environment, such as the ARM TrustZone extensions, but such hardware does not control the operating system operations sufficiently to enable VM introspection. In particular, a conventional operating system running with TrustZone still retains full control of memory management, which a rootkit can use to prevent traps on sensitive instructions or memory accesses necessary for effective introspection. In this paper, we present SPROBES, a novel primitive that enables introspection of operating systems running on ARM TrustZone hardware. Using SPROBES, an introspection mechanism protected by TrustZone can instrument individual operating system instructions of its choice, receiving an unforgeable trap whenever any SPROBE is executed. The key challenge in designing SPROBES is preventing the rootkit from removing them, but we identify a set of five invariants whose enforcement is sufficient to restrict rootkits to execute only approved, SPROBE-injected kernel code. We implemented a proof-of-concept version of SPROBES for the ARM Fast Models emulator, demonstrating that in Linux kernel 2.6.38, only 12 SPROBES are sufficient to enforce all five of these invariants. With SPROBES we show that it is possible to leverage the limited TrustZone extensions to limit conventional kernel execution to approved code comprehensively.