Pricing in Social Networks with Negative Externalities
Zhigang Cao, Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Changjun Wang

TL;DR
This paper investigates revenue maximization through pricing strategies in social networks with negative externalities, revealing computational hardness and proposing approximation algorithms.
Contribution
It introduces the first hardness results for optimal iterative pricing with negative externalities and offers a 2-approximation algorithm for general networks.
Findings
Optimal iterative pricing is NP-hard even on simple tree networks.
A 2-approximation algorithm is developed for general weighted networks.
Single pricing can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to iterative pricing.
Abstract
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller posts a price not greater than their values of the product. The product's value for a consumer is determined by two factors: a fixed consumer-specified intrinsic value and a variable externality that is exerted from the consumer's neighbors in a linear way. We study the scenario of negative externalities, which captures many interesting situations, but is much less understood in comparison with its positive externality counterpart. We assume complete information about the network, consumers' intrinsic values, and the negative externalities. The maximum revenue is in general achieved by iterative pricing, which offers impatient consumers a sequence of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Facility Location and Emergency Management
