Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a Public Goods Game

TL;DR

This paper investigates how reputation scores and network structures influence cooperation in large groups using a Public Goods Game, showing that partner selection can promote cooperation efficiently.

Contribution

It demonstrates that reputation-based partner selection in bipartite networks significantly enhances cooperation in large groups within a short time frame.

Findings

Reputation scores support cooperation in large groups.

Partner selection enables cooperation in bipartite networks.

Cooperation emerges quickly with reputation-based partner choice.

Abstract

In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.