Distributed Detection in Tree Networks: Byzantines and Mitigation Techniques

TL;DR

This paper investigates distributed detection in tree networks with malicious Byzantines, deriving optimal attack and defense strategies, modeling their interaction as a Stackelberg game, and proposing a reputation-based Byzantine detection scheme.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for optimal attack and defense strategies in Byzantine-affected tree networks and proposes a reputation-based detection method.

Findings

Closed-form attack strategies that minimize detection error

Stackelberg game model predicts equilibrium strategies

Reputation scheme effectively identifies Byzantines

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of distributed detection in tree networks in the presence of Byzantines is considered. Closed form expressions for optimal attacking strategies that minimize the miss detection error exponent at the fusion center (FC) are obtained. We also look at the problem from the network designer's (FC's) perspective. We study the problem of designing optimal distributed detection parameters in a tree network in the presence of Byzantines. Next, we model the strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker as a Leader-Follower (Stackelberg) game. This formulation provides a methodology for predicting attacker and defender (FC) equilibrium strategies, which can be used to implement the optimal detector. Finally, a reputation based scheme to identify Byzantines is proposed and its performance is analytically evaluated. We also provide some numerical examples to gain insights into the solution.