THRIVE: Threshold Homomorphic encryption based secure and privacy preserving bIometric VErification system
Cagatay Karabat, Mehmet Sabir Kiraz, Hakan Erdogan, Erkay Savas

TL;DR
The paper introduces THRIVE, a secure biometric verification system utilizing threshold homomorphic encryption to protect user privacy and prevent template leakage during authentication.
Contribution
It presents a novel biometric verification protocol based on threshold homomorphic cryptosystem with security proof, enabling privacy-preserving and secure biometric authentication.
Findings
System achieves 336 ms connection time for 256-bit biohash vectors.
Ensures security against malicious database owners and protocol deviations.
Compatible with any biometric modality with binarized templates.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new biometric verification and template protection system which we call the THRIVE system. The system includes novel enrollment and authentication protocols based on threshold homomorphic cryptosystem where the private key is shared between a user and the verifier. In the THRIVE system, only encrypted binary biometric templates are stored in the database and verification is performed via homomorphically randomized templates, thus, original templates are never revealed during the authentication stage. The THRIVE system is designed for the malicious model where the cheating party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification. Since threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used, a malicious database owner cannot perform decryption on encrypted templates of the users in the database. Therefore, security of the THRIVE system is enhanced using a…
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