Navigating in the Cayley graph of $SL_2(F_p)$ and applications to hashing
Lisa Bromberg, Vladimir Shpilrain, Alina Vdovina

TL;DR
This paper investigates the security of Cayley hash functions based on 2x2 matrices over finite fields, analyzing potential attacks and providing bounds on collision lengths for certain matrix pairs.
Contribution
It demonstrates that for specific matrix pairs, the lifting attack does not compromise the hash function's security and provides explicit collision length bounds.
Findings
Lifting attack can produce collisions in the group but not in the positive monoid.
Certain matrix pairs are resistant to known collision attacks.
Explicit lower bounds on collision lengths are established.
Abstract
Cayley hash functions are based on a simple idea of using a pair of (semi)group elements, and , to hash the 0 and 1 bit, respectively, and then to hash an arbitrary bit string in the natural way, by using multiplication of elements in the (semi)group. In this paper, we focus on hashing with matrices over . Since there are many known pairs of matrices over that generate a free monoid, this yields numerous pairs of matrices over , for a sufficiently large prime , that are candidates for collision-resistant hashing. However, this trick can "backfire", and lifting matrix entries to may facilitate finding a collision. This "lifting attack" was successfully used by Tillich and Z\'emor in the special case where two matrices and generate (as a monoid) the whole monoid . However, in this paper we show that the situation…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCoding theory and cryptography · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · semigroups and automata theory
