Colorful linear programming, Nash equilibrium, and pivots
Fr\'ed\'eric Meunier, Pauline Sarrabezolles

TL;DR
This paper explores colorful linear programming, connecting it to game theory and combinatorics, and introduces algorithms and complexity results for finding solutions like Nash equilibria and sets guaranteed by the colorful Carathéodory theorem.
Contribution
It establishes that computing Nash equilibria can be formulated as colorful linear programming and introduces a variant of Bárány's algorithm linked to the simplex method.
Findings
Computing Nash equilibrium is a colorful linear programming problem.
Deciding and optimizing in colorful linear programming are computationally equivalent.
A new algorithm variant connects colorful Carathéodory sets with the simplex algorithm.
Abstract
The colorful Carath\'eodory theorem, proved by B\'ar\'any in 1982, states that given d+1 sets of points S_1,...,S_{d+1} in R^d, with each S_i containing 0 in its convex hull, there exists a subset T of the union of the S_i's containing 0 in its convex hull and such that T contains at most one point from each S_i. An intriguing question -- still open -- is whether such a set T, whose existence is ensured, can be found in polynomial time. In 1997, B\'ar\'any and Onn defined colorful linear programming as algorithmic questions related to the colorful Carath\'eodory theorem. The question we just mentioned comes under colorful linear programming. The traditional applications of colorful linear programming lie in discrete geometry. In this paper, we study its relations with other areas, such as game theory, operations research, and combinatorics. Regarding game theory, we prove that…
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