Imitation versus payoff - duality of the decision-making process demonstrates criticality and consensus formation

TL;DR

This paper explores a dual decision-making model combining imitation and rational calculation, revealing how their interaction influences criticality and consensus formation, and increases cooperation in strategic settings.

Contribution

It introduces a combined model of decision making and evolutionary game dynamics, showing how their interaction enhances phase transition effects and cooperation levels.

Findings

Interaction broadens the domain of phase transition dynamics.

The influence of imitation increases the final cooperation fraction.

The combined model exhibits criticality and consensus formation.

Abstract

We consider a dual model of decision making, in which an individual forms its opinion based on contrasting mechanisms of imitation and rational calculation. The decision making model (DMM) implements imitating behavior by means of a network of coupled two-state master equations that undergoes a phase transition at a critical value of a control parameter. The evolutionary spatial game (EGM), being a generalization of the Prisoner's dilemma game, is used to determine in objective fashion the cooperative or anti-cooperative strategy adopted by individuals. Interactions between two sources of dynamics increases the domain of initial states attracted to phase transition dynamics beyond that of the DMM network in isolation. Additionally, on average the influence of the DMM on the game increases the final observed fraction of cooperators in the system.