On the Two-user Multi-carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game

TL;DR

This paper introduces a hierarchical game model for two-user multi-carrier systems that promotes spectrum orthogonalization, improving energy efficiency and spectral utilization through sequential decision-making and analytical bounds.

Contribution

It presents a novel hierarchical game approach analyzing equilibrium properties, spectrum orthogonalization, and spectral efficiency bounds in multi-carrier wireless networks.

Findings

Spectrum orthogonalization occurs naturally in the hierarchical game.

The model provides tight bounds on spectral efficiency including carrier and user correlation.

Hierarchical decision-making improves energy and spectrum efficiency.

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Interestingly, we formally show that a spectrum orthogonalization naturally occurs when users decide sequentially about their transmitting carriers and powers, delivering a binary channel assignment. Both analytical and simulation results are provided for assessing and improving the performances in terms of energy efficiency and spectrum utilization between the simultaneous-move game (with synchronous decision makers), the social welfare (in a centralized manner) and the proposed Stackelberg (hierarchical) game. For the first time, we provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model, including correlation across carriers and users. We show that the spectrum orthogonalization capability induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency.