Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma
Pengbi Cui, Zhi-Xi Wu

TL;DR
This study shows that selfish punishment combined with an avoiding mechanism can effectively reduce both first-order and second-order social dilemmas in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game, supported by analytical and simulation results.
Contribution
It introduces a novel four-strategy spatial game model with an avoiding mechanism and develops an extended pair approximation method for analyzing strategy dynamics.
Findings
Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism alleviates social dilemmas.
The extended pair approximation accurately predicts strategy frequencies.
Interaction webs reveal stable coexistence of strategies.
Abstract
Punishment, especially selfish punishment, has recently been identified as a potent promoter in sustaining or even enhancing the cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, without other key mechanisms, the first-order social dilemma and second-order social dilemma are still two enduring conundrums in biology and the social sciences even with the presence of punishment. In the present study, we investigate a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner's dilemma game model with avoiding mechanism, where the four strategies are cooperation, defection, altruistic and selfish punishment. By introducing the low level of random mutation of strategies, we demonstrate that the presence of selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate the two kinds of social dilemmas for various parametrizations. In addition, we propose an extended pair approximation method, whose solutions can…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
