Sharing of Unlicensed Spectrum by Strategic Operators
Fei Teng, Dongning Guo, Michael L. Honig

TL;DR
This paper investigates how strategic wireless operators can share unlicensed spectrum efficiently using game theory, proposing static and dynamic schemes that improve revenue and coexistence, relevant for LTE-U deployment.
Contribution
It introduces a novel game-theoretic framework for spectrum sharing among strategic operators, including static and dynamic schemes with equilibrium analysis.
Findings
Static sharing scheme achieves subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Dynamic sharing scheme outperforms static sharing in revenue and efficiency.
Proposed schemes facilitate LTE-U deployment in unlicensed bands.
Abstract
Facing the challenge of meeting ever-increasing demand for wireless data, the industry is striving to exploit large swaths of spectrum which anyone can use for free without having to obtain a license. Major standards bodies are currently considering a proposal to retool and deploy Long Term Evolution (LTE) technologies in unlicensed bands below 6 GHz. This paper studies the fundamental questions of whether and how the unlicensed spectrum can be shared by intrinsically strategic operators without suffering from the tragedy of the commons. A class of general utility functions is considered. The spectrum sharing problem is formulated as a repeated game over a sequence of time slots. It is first shown that a simple static sharing scheme allows a given set of operators to reach a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for mutually beneficial sharing. The question of how many operators will choose…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · ICT Impact and Policies · Digital Platforms and Economics
