An Optimal Game Theoretical Framework for Mobility Aware Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game theoretical framework for mobility-aware routing in MANETs, optimizing incentives for cooperation while considering node mobility and reducing overpayments.

Contribution

It presents a multi-dimensional optimal auction mechanism that accounts for path duration and costs, minimizing total expected payments in mobility-aware routing.

Findings

Significant reduction in overpayments compared to existing methods.

Effective incentive compatibility in mobility-aware routing.

Theoretical proof of optimality in payment minimization.

Abstract

Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes. In order to provide sufficient incentives, most of these methods pay nodes a premium over their actual costs of participation. However, they lead to considerably large overpayments. Moreover, existing methods ignore mobility of nodes, for simplicity. However, owing to the mobile nature of MANETs, this assumption seems unrealistic. In this paper, we propose an optimal game theoretical framework to ensure the proper cooperation in mobility aware routing for MANETs. The proposed method is based on the multi-dimensional optimal auctions which allows us to consider path durations, in addition to the route costs. Path duration is a metric that best reflects changes in topology caused by mobility of nodes and, it is widely used in mobility aware routing protocols. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism is optimal in that it minimizes the total expected payments. We provide theoretical analysis to support our claims. In addition, simulation results show significant improvements in terms of payments compared to the most popular existing methods.