On Manipulation in Prediction Markets When Participants Influence Outcomes Directly
Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das

TL;DR
This paper models how prediction markets are affected when participants can influence the actual outcome, revealing two types of equilibria: truthful and collusive, which impact the reliability of market predictions.
Contribution
It introduces a novel two-stage game model capturing direct influence on outcomes and analyzes equilibrium behaviors in prediction markets.
Findings
LPP equilibria reveal expected outcomes based on private information.
HPP equilibria involve collusive, uninformative coordination.
The model demonstrates how influence can distort market predictions.
Abstract
Prediction markets are often used as mechanisms to aggregate information about a future event, for example, whether a candidate will win an election. The event is typically assumed to be exogenous. In reality, participants may influence the outcome, and therefore (1) running the prediction market could change the incentives of participants in the process that creates the outcome (for example, agents may want to change their vote in an election), and (2) simple results such as the myopic incentive compatibility of proper scoring rules no longer hold in the prediction market itself. We introduce a model of games of this kind, where agents first trade in a prediction market and then take an action that influences the market outcome. Our two-stage two-player model, despite its simplicity, captures two aspects of real-world prediction markets: (1) agents may directly influence the outcome,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSports Analytics and Performance · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
