Fixation results for the two-feature Axelrod model with a variable number of opinions
Nicolas Lanchier, Paul-Henri Moisson

TL;DR
This paper investigates a generalized Axelrod model for cultural dissemination, demonstrating that in a one-dimensional setting with two features, the system fixates when the sum of the number of opinions across features is at least six.
Contribution
It introduces a more realistic Axelrod model with variable opinions per feature and establishes fixation conditions based on the sum of opinions.
Findings
Fixation occurs when q1 + q2 ≥ 6 in the one-dimensional two-feature model.
The model generalizes previous fixed opinion models by allowing variable opinion counts.
Provides theoretical insight into the conditions leading to cultural consensus or diversity.
Abstract
The Axelrod model is a spatial stochastic model for the dynamics of cultures that includes two key social mechanisms: homophily and social influence, respectively defined as the tendency of individuals to interact more frequently with individuals who are more similar and the tendency of individuals to become more similar when they interact. The original model assumes that individuals are located on the vertex set of an interaction network and are characterized by their culture, a vector of opinions about cultural features, each of which offering the same number of alternatives. Pairs of neighbors interact at a rate proportional to the number of cultural features for which they agree, which results in one more agreement between the two neighbors. In this article, we study a more general and more realistic version of the standard Axelrod model that allows for a variable number of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Game Theory and Applications
