Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production
Aaron Shaw, and Benjamin Mako Hill

TL;DR
This study empirically tests whether peer production projects like Wikipedia tend to become oligarchic as they grow, supporting Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' with data from 683 wikis.
Contribution
It provides the first large-scale empirical evidence that peer production projects tend to develop oligarchic structures as they expand.
Findings
Support for Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' in peer production.
Oligarchic tendencies increase with project growth.
Peer production often exhibits entrenched leadership and inequalities.
Abstract
Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associations, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collaboration as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal processes from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels' iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms.
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Taxonomy
TopicsWikis in Education and Collaboration · Open Source Software Innovations · Social Media and Politics
