Optimal cooperation-trap strategies for the iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors game

TL;DR

This paper introduces a strategy in iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors that enables players to achieve cooperation and fairness, overcoming the typical Nash equilibrium outcome of self-interested play.

Contribution

It presents a novel cooperation-trap strategy that enforces cooperation in an iterated RPS game, leading to mutually beneficial outcomes.

Findings

Cooperation can be enforced in a competitive cyclic game.

The strategy achieves maximal fairness between players.

It offers insights into conflict resolution and cooperation enhancement.

Abstract

In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two players X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial as well as maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate creative thinking on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.