Allocating Indivisible Resources under Price Rigidities in Polynomial Time
Wei Huang, Jian Lou, Zhonghua Wen

TL;DR
This paper presents a polynomial-time dynamic mechanism for allocating indivisible resources under price rigidities, balancing efficiency and social needs, and addressing strategic considerations.
Contribution
It introduces a polynomial algorithm for over-demanded set detection and a dynamic mechanism with rationing to find constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidities.
Findings
Efficient polynomial algorithm for over-demanded set detection
Mechanism achieves constrained Walrasian equilibrium in polynomial time
Addresses strategic behavior and profit computation in the allocation process
Abstract
In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible items under price rigidities. We propose a polynomial algorithm that can be used to find over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of sellers' expected profits and items' expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications
