Target Tracking via Crowdsourcing: A Mechanism Design Approach

TL;DR

This paper introduces a mechanism design-based crowdsourcing framework for target tracking in wireless sensor networks, ensuring truthful participation and optimizing resource allocation for improved tracking and network longevity.

Contribution

It develops an incentive-compatible auction mechanism for selfish sensors, guaranteeing truthfulness and rationality in target tracking tasks within bandwidth-limited WSNs.

Findings

Enhanced tracking accuracy demonstrated in simulations

Extended sensor network lifetime achieved

Effective resource allocation through auction mechanism

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a crowdsourcing based framework for myopic target tracking by designing an incentive-compatible mechanism based optimal auction in a wireless sensor network (WSN) containing sensors that are selfish and profit-motivated. For typical WSNs which have limited bandwidth, the fusion center (FC) has to distribute the total number of bits that can be transmitted from the sensors to the FC among the sensors. To accomplish the task, the FC conducts an auction by soliciting bids from the selfish sensors, which reflect how much they value their energy cost. Furthermore, the rationality and truthfulness of the sensors are guaranteed in our model. The final problem is formulated as a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP), which is solved by the dynamic programming method in pseudo-polynomial time. Simulation results show the effectiveness of our proposed approach in terms of both the tracking performance and lifetime of the sensor network.