Contextual Abductive Reasoning with Side-Effects
Lu\'is Moniz Pereira, Emmanuelle-Anna Dietz, Steffen H\"olldobler

TL;DR
This paper introduces a formal framework for abductive reasoning that incorporates side-effects and background knowledge, motivated by psychological experiments on belief bias, and provides a declarative semantics with potential broad applications.
Contribution
It formalizes new abductive context definitions with declarative semantics, integrating side-effects and background knowledge, extending previous models and enabling richer reasoning capabilities.
Findings
Formalization of abductive contexts with side-effects
Introduction of declarative semantics for abductive reasoning
Application to psychological reasoning phenomena
Abstract
The belief bias effect is a phenomenon which occurs when we think that we judge an argument based on our reasoning, but are actually influenced by our beliefs and prior knowledge. Evans, Barston and Pollard carried out a psychological syllogistic reasoning task to prove this effect. Participants were asked whether they would accept or reject a given syllogism. We discuss one specific case which is commonly assumed to be believable but which is actually not logically valid. By introducing abnormalities, abduction and background knowledge, we adequately model this case under the weak completion semantics. Our formalization reveals new questions about possible extensions in abductive reasoning. For instance, observations and their explanations might include some relevant prior abductive contextual information concerning some side-effect or leading to a contestable or refutable side-effect.…
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