Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly: Part II
Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries select prices and locations under uncertain channel qualities, deriving explicit symmetric Nash equilibria for different conflict graph scenarios and revealing structural differences.
Contribution
It provides explicit symmetric Nash equilibria for spectrum pricing and location selection in small and large region models, highlighting structural differences.
Findings
Explicit symmetric NE for mean valid graphs in small regions
Symmetric NE for node symmetric graphs in large regions
Threshold-based and maximum independent set strategies
Abstract
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary access to its channel at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve randomly. Each primary needs to select a price and a set of non-interfering locations (which is an independent set in the conflict graph of the region) at which to offer its channel without knowing the transmission qualities of the channels of its competitors. We formulate the above problem as a non-cooperative game. We consider two scenarios-i) when the region is small, ii) when the region is large. In the first setting, we focus on a class of conflict graphs, known as mean valid graphs which commonly arise when the region is small. We explicitly compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE); the NE is threshold type in that primaries only choose independent set whose cardinality is greater than a certain threshold.…
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