Inverse Stackelberg Solutions for Games with Many Followers
Yurii Averboukh

TL;DR
This paper studies inverse Stackelberg games involving many players, providing characterizations and existence results for solutions in static and differential game settings under strategy set compactness.
Contribution
It introduces new solution characterizations and existence theorems for inverse Stackelberg games with multiple followers, expanding the theoretical framework.
Findings
Characterization of inverse Stackelberg solutions
Existence theorems under concavity conditions
Applicability to static and differential games
Abstract
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and differential games. The main assumption of the paper is the compactness of the strategy sets. We obtain the characterization of inverse Stackelberg solutions and under additional concavity conditions establish the existence theorem.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models · Nonlinear Differential Equations Analysis
