Adversarial Wiretap Channel with Public Discussion
Pengwei Wang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that with a public discussion channel, secure communication is achievable in adversarial wiretap channels even when the adversary's capabilities exceed previous limits, and provides optimal protocols and bounds.
Contribution
It introduces a formal model of adversarial wiretap channels with public discussion and derives tight bounds and optimal protocols for secure communication.
Findings
Secure communication possible if + >1 with public discussion
Constructed rate-optimal protocols with minimal message rounds
Established new bounds for Secure Message Transmission with Public Discussion
Abstract
Wyner's elegant model of wiretap channel exploits noise in the communication channel to provide perfect secrecy against a computationally unlimited eavesdropper without requiring a shared key. We consider an adversarial model of wiretap channel proposed in [18,19] where the adversary is active: it selects a fraction of the transmitted codeword to eavesdrop and a fraction of the codeword to corrupt by "adding" adversarial error. It was shown that this model also captures network adversaries in the setting of 1-round Secure Message Transmission [8]. It was proved that secure communication (1-round) is possible if and only if . In this paper we show that by allowing communicants to have access to a public discussion channel (authentic communication without secrecy) secure communication becomes possible even if . We formalize the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWireless Communication Security Techniques · Cryptography and Data Security · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
