An Iterated Game of Uncoordinated Sharing of Licensed Spectrum Using Zero-Determinant Strategies

TL;DR

This paper models uncoordinated spectrum sharing as an iterated game and demonstrates how secondary service providers can use zero-determinant strategies to control long-term access rates despite demand heterogeneity.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for spectrum sharing and shows how zero-determinant strategies can fix long-term rates in uncoordinated environments.

Findings

Zero-determinant strategies enable control over long-term rates.

Binary action strategies can fix rates regardless of opponent strategies.

The structure of the single-stage game influences long-term control.

Abstract

We consider private commons for secondary sharing of licensed spectrum bands with no access coordination provided by the primary license holder. In such environments, heterogeneity in demand patterns of the secondary users can lead to constant changes in the interference levels, and thus can be a source of volatility to the utilities of the users. In this paper, we consider secondary users to be service providers that provide downlink services. We formulate the spectrum sharing problem as a non-cooperative iterated game of power control where service providers change their power levels to fix their long-term average rates at utility-maximizing values. First, we show that in any iterated 2x2 game, the structure of the single-stage game dictates the degree of control that a service provider can exert on the long-term outcome of the game. Then we show that if service providers use binary actions either to access or not to access the channel at any round of the game, then the long-term rate can be fixed regardless of the strategy of the opponent. We identify these rates and show that they can be achieved using mixed Markovian strategies that will be clearly identified in the paper.