Actor-Critic Algorithms for Learning Nash Equilibria in N-player General-Sum Games
H.L Prasad, L.A.Prashanth, Shalabh Bhatnagar

TL;DR
This paper introduces two actor-critic algorithms, OFF-SGSP and ON-SGSP, for finding Nash equilibria in N-player general-sum stochastic games, with proven convergence and superior performance in complex game setups.
Contribution
The paper generalizes a non-linear optimization framework to N-player settings and develops two convergent actor-critic algorithms for Nash equilibrium computation in stochastic games.
Findings
Both algorithms converge to Nash equilibria in self-play.
ON-SGSP outperforms existing algorithms like NashQ and FFQ.
Algorithms are effective in large state space games with hundreds of thousands of states.
Abstract
We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochastic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from Filar and Vrieze [2004] to a -player setting and break down this problem into simpler sub-problems that ensure there is no Bellman error for a given state and an agent. We then provide a characterization of solution points of these sub-problems that correspond to Nash equilibria of the underlying game and for this purpose, we derive a set of necessary and sufficient SG-SP (Stochastic Game - Sub-Problem) conditions. Using these conditions, we develop two actor-critic algorithms: OFF-SGSP (model-based) and ON-SGSP (model-free). Both algorithms use a critic that estimates the value function for a fixed policy and an actor that performs descent in the policy space using a descent direction that avoids local…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Auction Theory and Applications
