Simultaneous auctions for complementary goods
Wiroy Shin

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a model of simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods, demonstrating the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a simplified two-bidder, two-good setting.
Contribution
It introduces a formal model for simultaneous auctions of complementary goods and proves the existence of equilibrium strategies within this framework.
Findings
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Model incorporates private values and complementarity explicitly.
Framework applicable to multi-good auction environments.
Abstract
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions and two bidders. We show that a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists in the environment.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
