Notions of Anonymity, Fairness and Symmetry for Finite Strategic-Form Games
Nicholas Ham

TL;DR
This paper surveys various notions of anonymity, fairness, and symmetry in finite strategic-form games, analyzing their relationships and providing a framework for constructing and ordering symmetric games.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive survey of symmetry and anonymity notions, formalizes game isomorphisms as groupoids, and offers methods to construct and classify symmetric games.
Findings
Game bijections and isomorphisms form groupoids.
Matchings characterize strategy triviality.
Framework for constructing and ordering symmetric games.
Abstract
In this paper we survey various notions of anonymity and symmetry for finite strategic-form games present in relevant literature, and discuss notions of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce matchings as a convenient characterisation of strategy triviality; and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised (symmetric) games with examples that range all combinations of surveyed symmetry notions, which when combined with other results in this paper gives the precise relationship between the various symmetry notions.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
