On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism in markets with strategic agents, proving that even in equilibrium, welfare is at least 25% of optimal under certain valuation conditions, regardless of market size.
Contribution
It establishes a universal lower bound on equilibrium welfare for the Walrasian mechanism with gross substitute valuations, independent of market size.
Findings
Pure Nash equilibria guarantee at least 25% of optimal welfare.
Efficiency bounds hold without large market assumptions.
Results apply to markets with gross substitute valuations and no overbidding.
Abstract
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz (1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are strategic about their demands. This is captured by the \emph{Walrasian Mechanism} that proceeds by collecting reported demands, finding clearing prices in the \emph{reported} market via an ascending price t\^{a}tonnement procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used, for example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper and gold in London. In practice, it is commonly observed that agents in such markets reduce their demand leading to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
