When is an Example a Counterexample?
Eric Pacuit, Arthur Paul Pedersen, Jan-Willem Romeijn

TL;DR
This paper clarifies the distinction between genuine counterexamples and misapplications in iterated belief revision, emphasizing careful analysis in philosophical and theoretical contexts.
Contribution
It offers a conceptual analysis to differentiate true counterexamples from misapplications in the AGM belief revision framework.
Findings
The example is better seen as a misapplication, not a genuine counterexample.
Highlights the importance of detailed application in belief revision theory.
Provides insights into the philosophical foundations of AGM theory.
Abstract
In this extended abstract, we carefully examine a purported counterexample to a postulate of iterated belief revision. We suggest that the example is better seen as a failure to apply the theory of belief revision in sufficient detail. The main contribution is conceptual aiming at the literature on the philosophical foundations of the AGM theory of belief revision [1]. Our discussion is centered around the observation that it is often unclear whether a specific example is a "genuine" counterexample to an abstract theory or a misapplication of that theory to a concrete case.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Logic, programming, and type systems
