Bounded rationality in a dynamic alternate game
Eduardo Espinosa-Avila, Francisco Hernandez-Quiroz

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new bounded rationality model for analyzing the game of dominoes, addressing the computational challenges of finding equilibria in complex dynamic alternate games.
Contribution
It proposes a limited forecast model to handle the node explosion problem in dominoes, providing a novel approach to game analysis under bounded rationality.
Findings
New bounded rationality model for dominoes
Addresses computational complexity in equilibrium determination
Provides a framework for analyzing complex dynamic games
Abstract
From the standpoint of game theory, dominoes is a game that has not received much attention (specially the variety known as draw). It is usually thought that this game is already solved, given general results in game theory. However, the determination of equilibria is not feasible for the general case because of the well known problem of node explosion in the tree expressing the game. We propose a new model based in limited forecast as a kind of bounded rationality for dynamic alternate games.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis
