Incentive Design for Direct Load Control Programs
Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Yuanzhang Xiao, Anna Scaglione, Mihaela van der, Schaar

TL;DR
This paper develops an optimization framework for designing incentives that encourage electricity customers to participate voluntarily in a real-time, flexible appliance load control program, balancing customer risk perceptions and operator profit.
Contribution
It introduces a dynamic incentive design model for direct load control programs considering private customer risk preferences and real-time decision making.
Findings
Operator profit maximization through incentive posting
Upper bounds on demand response benefits
Customer participation influenced by risk perception
Abstract
We study the problem of optimal incentive design for voluntary participation of electricity customers in a Direct Load Scheduling (DLS) program, a new form of Direct Load Control (DLC) based on a three way communication protocol between customers, embedded controls in flexible appliances, and the central entity in charge of the program. Participation decisions are made in real-time on an event-based basis, with every customer that needs to use a flexible appliance considering whether to join the program given current incentives. Customers have different interpretations of the level of risk associated with committing to pass over the control over the consumption schedule of their devices to an operator, and these risk levels are only privately known. The operator maximizes his expected profit of operating the DLS program by posting the right participation incentives for different…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Grid Energy Management · Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure · Microgrid Control and Optimization
