Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation

TL;DR

This paper presents a model analyzing how cooperation can evolve in signed networks by incorporating triadic interactions, showing that cooperation is unlikely with only dyadic interactions but can emerge when considering triads.

Contribution

The study introduces a model that demonstrates the importance of triadic interactions in promoting cooperation in signed networks, a novel perspective compared to dyadic-only models.

Findings

Cooperation does not evolve with dyadic interactions alone.

Triadic interactions create conditions for stable cooperation.

Inclusion of triads enables cooperation to emerge as a stable behavior.

Abstract

We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.