On evolutionary games with periodic payoffs

TL;DR

This paper investigates evolutionary stable strategies in games with periodic payoffs, demonstrating how periodic modifications to payoffs can promote cooperation under certain initial conditions.

Contribution

It introduces two cases of evolutionary stable strategies with periodic payoffs, including a generalization and a prisoner's dilemma variant, highlighting conditions for cooperation.

Findings

Periodic payoff adjustments can foster cooperation.

Reducing defection payoff encourages cooperation if initial cooperators > 0.6.

Periodic payoffs influence evolutionary stability in strategic interactions.

Abstract

Two cases of evolutionary stable strategy with periodic payoffs are studied. The first is a generalization of Uyttendaele et al. The second is prisoner's dilemma with periodic payoff. It is shown that reducing the defection payoff by a periodic term is sufficient to introduce cooperation provided that the initial fraction of cooperators is greater than 0.6.