On the Effectiveness of Punishments in a Repeated Epidemic Dissemination Game

TL;DR

This paper uses game theory to analyze how punishments influence cooperation in repeated epidemic dissemination games, comparing public and private monitoring scenarios and identifying conditions for effectiveness.

Contribution

It provides a theoretical analysis of punishment strategies in epidemic dissemination, highlighting the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity under different monitoring conditions.

Findings

Public monitoring shows direct reciprocity is ineffective.

Full indirect reciprocity nearly optimizes cooperation.

Private monitoring requires specific network topologies for punishments to work.

Abstract

This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end of each stage, a monitoring mechanism informs each player of the actions of other nodes. The effectiveness of a punishing strategy is measured as the range of values for the benefit-to-cost ratio that sustain cooperation. This paper studies both public and private monitoring. Under public monitoring, we show that direct reciprocity is not an effective incentive, whereas full indirect reciprocity provides a nearly optimal effectiveness. Under private monitoring, we identify necessary conditions regarding the topology of the graph in order for punishments to be effective. When punishments are coordinated, full indirect reciprocity is also effective with private monitoring.