On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production
Jugal Garg, Vijay V. Vazirani

TL;DR
This paper advances the understanding of computational equilibria in markets with production by defining SPLC production, formulating an LCP, and providing a complementary pivot algorithm, proving PPAD membership and hardness, and demonstrating practical efficiency.
Contribution
It introduces a linear complementarity problem formulation and a pivot algorithm for markets with SPLC production, extending previous work to include production and proving key complexity results.
Findings
The algorithm efficiently finds equilibria in markets with SPLC production.
The problem is shown to be in PPAD and PPAD-hard, indicating computational complexity.
The approach is strongly polynomial for fixed numbers of goods or agents.
Abstract
Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant step towards understanding computational aspects of markets with production. We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production by analogy with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation that captures exactly the set of equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC production, and we give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This settles a question asked by Eaves in 1975 of extending his complementary pivot algorithm to markets with production. Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of this…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
