PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Efficient Spectrum Auction Mechanisms

TL;DR

This paper introduces PPS, a privacy-preserving, strategyproof spectrum auction framework that maximizes social efficiency in single-unit and multi-unit models with low overhead.

Contribution

It proposes a novel privacy-preserving auction framework and designs two approximation mechanisms for different spectrum auction models, ensuring strategyproofness and efficiency.

Findings

Achieves near-optimal social efficiency with approximation factors of (1+ε) and 32.

Ensures privacy preservation and strategyproofness in spectrum auctions.

Operates with low computational and communication overhead.

Abstract

Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof spectrum auction framework. Then, we design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the Single-Unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel to be sold in the spectrum market; and 2) the Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.