Wi-Fi Offload: Tragedy of the Commons or Land of Milk and Honey?

TL;DR

This paper uses game theory to analyze how Wi-Fi offloading impacts competition among operators, highlighting potential issues like spectrum congestion and the need for new control measures to prevent tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios.

Contribution

It provides a game-theoretic framework to compare strategies of fixed and mobile operators in Wi-Fi offloading and discusses implications for spectrum management and policy.

Findings

Competition depends on inter-operator collaboration models.

The ratio of backhaul to Wi-Fi access speeds influences outcomes.

Unregulated spectrum use risks tragedy-of-the-commons problems.

Abstract

Fueled by its recent success in provisioning on-site wireless Internet access, Wi-Fi is currently perceived as the best positioned technology for pervasive mobile macro network offloading. However, the broad transitions of multiple collocated operators towards this new paradigm may result in fierce competition for the common unlicensed spectrum at hand. In this light, our paper game-theoretically dissects market convergence scenarios by assessing the competition between providers in terms of network performance, capacity constraints, cost reductions, and revenue prospects. We will closely compare the prospects and strategic positioning of fixed line operators offering Wi-Fi services with respect to competing mobile network operators utilizing unlicensed spectrum. Our results highlight important dependencies upon inter-operator collaboration models, and more importantly, upon the ratio between backhaul and Wi-Fi access bit-rates. Furthermore, our investigation of medium- to long-term convergence scenarios indicates that a rethinking of control measures targeting the large-scale monetization of unlicensed spectrum may be required, as otherwise the used free bands may become subject to tragedy-of-commons type of problems.