Edge effects in game theoretic dynamics of spatially structured tumours
Artem Kaznatcheev, Jacob G. Scott, David Basanta

TL;DR
This paper investigates how spatial edge effects influence tumor invasion dynamics by applying an evolutionary game theory model with spatial structure, revealing that tumor boundaries can harbor invasive cells even when the bulk does not.
Contribution
It introduces the use of the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform to incorporate spatial heterogeneity into tumor evolution models, highlighting the significance of boundary effects on invasion.
Findings
Spatial structure promotes invasive strategies in tumors.
Tumor boundaries can harbor invasive cells despite non-invasive bulk.
Edge effects can lead to underestimation of invasive cell populations.
Abstract
Background: Analysing tumour architecture for metastatic potential usually focuses on phenotypic differences due to cellular morphology or specific genetic mutations, but often ignore the cell's position within the heterogeneous substructure. Similar disregard for local neighborhood structure is common in mathematical models. Methods: We view the dynamics of disease progression as an evolutionary game between cellular phenotypes. A typical assumption in this modeling paradigm is that the probability of a given phenotypic strategy interacting with another depends exclusively on the abundance of those strategies without regard local heterogeneities. We address this limitation by using the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform to introduce spatial structure to the go vs. grow game. Results: We show that spatial structure can promote the invasive (go) strategy. By considering the change in…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical Biology Tumor Growth · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
