Finding Optimal Strategies in a Multi-Period Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Game Using an Evolutionary Algorithm
Ankur Sinha, Pekka Malo, Anton Frantsev, Kalyanmoy Deb

TL;DR
This paper introduces a nested evolutionary algorithm to solve complex multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg games with non-linear functions and discrete variables, demonstrating its effectiveness on challenging bilevel problems.
Contribution
It presents a novel nested evolutionary approach for solving complex bilevel Stackelberg games with multiple players and non-linearities, extending beyond traditional methods.
Findings
The algorithm successfully solves difficult bilevel problems.
Player entry and exit significantly impact profits.
The method performs well on a test suite of complex problems.
Abstract
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the other. Despite a number of studies on handling bilevel optimization problems, these problems still remain a challenging territory, and existing methodologies are able to handle only simple problems with few variables under assumptions of continuity and differentiability. In this paper, we consider a special case of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg competition model with non-linear cost and demand functions and discrete production variables. The model has potential applications, for instance in aircraft manufacturing industry, which is an oligopoly where a few giant firms enjoy a tremendous commitment power over the other smaller…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
