Decision Making for Inconsistent Expert Judgments Using Negative Probabilities
J. Acacio de Barros

TL;DR
This paper compares Bayesian, quantum-like, and negative probabilities methods for handling inconsistent expert judgments, demonstrating that negative probabilities offer superior normative power in the analyzed example.
Contribution
It introduces a simple example of inconsistent information and evaluates three approaches, highlighting the advantages of negative probabilities over Bayesian and quantum-like methods.
Findings
Negative probabilities provide better normative power in the example.
Bayesian and quantum-like approaches are less effective for inconsistent judgments.
The paper offers a comparative analysis of three different decision-making frameworks.
Abstract
In this paper we provide a simple random-variable example of inconsistent information, and analyze it using three different approaches: Bayesian, quantum-like, and negative probabilities. We then show that, at least for this particular example, both the Bayesian and the quantum-like approaches have less normative power than the negative probabilities one.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
