On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol

TL;DR

This paper reviews the security vulnerabilities of the ADS-B protocol used in air traffic control, discusses recent attacks, and evaluates existing and potential countermeasures from related wireless network security research.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive survey of ADS-B security issues, recent attack proofs, and compares security solutions from related wireless network domains.

Findings

ADS-B lacks inherent security measures.

Recent proof-of-concept attacks demonstrate vulnerabilities.

Evaluates security approaches from sensor and vehicular networks.

Abstract

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.