The effectiveness of altruistic lobbying: A model study

TL;DR

This paper models altruistic lobbying strategies within social dynamics to evaluate their effectiveness, optimal participation levels, and dependence on societal well-being, providing insights into public interest advocacy.

Contribution

It introduces a stochastic model of social voting dynamics to analyze altruistic lobbying strategies and their effectiveness based on societal conditions.

Findings

Effectiveness of altruistic lobbying varies with societal well-being.

Optimal participant numbers depend on the lobbying strategy.

Poorest societies may benefit more from altruistic lobbying.

Abstract

Altruistic lobbying is lobbying in the public interest or in the interest of the least protected part of the society. In fact, an altruist has a wide range of strategies, from behaving in the interest of the society as a whole to the support of the most disadvantaged ones. How can we compare the effectiveness of such strategies? Another question is: "Given a strategy, is it possible to estimate the optimal number of participants choosing it?" Finally, do the answers to these questions depend on the level of well-being in the society? Can we say that the poorer the society, the more important is to focus on the support of the poorest? We answer these questions within the framework of the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment.