The problem of artificial precision in theories of vagueness: a note on the role of maximal consistency

TL;DR

This paper examines the issue of artificial precision in theories of vagueness, focusing on the role of maximal consistency in ukasiewicz logic, and clarifies that the problem conflates two distinct issues.

Contribution

It clarifies the distinction between two problems related to artificial precision and emphasizes the role of maximal consistent theories in ukasiewicz logic.

Findings

The problem of artificial precision conflates two distinct issues.

Maximal consistent theories play a crucial role in understanding vagueness.

The paper offers a nuanced perspective on degrees of truth in fuzzy logic.

Abstract

The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of "is red" receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0,1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of {\L}ukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the role of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature.