Reichenbach's Transcendental Probability

TL;DR

This paper reviews and analyzes Reichenbach's early Kantian justification for probabilistic concepts in physics, exploring the continuity with his later logical positivist and frequentist views.

Contribution

It provides a detailed analysis of Reichenbach's philosophical evolution, highlighting the underlying continuity between his Neo-Kantian and later perspectives on probability.

Findings

Reichenbach's early Kantian views influence his later work

Continuity exists between Reichenbach's early and later philosophical positions

The Kantian approach to probability persists in his logical positivist phase

Abstract

The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the Neo-Kantian justification for the application of probabilistic concepts in physics that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career, notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this Kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with Reichenbach's later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach's thought: typical features of his early Kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work.