Privacy and Mechanism Design
Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth

TL;DR
This survey explores how differential privacy influences mechanism design, modeling agent privacy costs, controlling mechanism stability, and enabling novel economic mechanisms beyond privacy concerns.
Contribution
It synthesizes recent advances showing differential privacy's role in modeling privacy costs and enhancing mechanism stability and design.
Findings
Differential privacy models agent privacy costs effectively.
Tools from differential privacy help control mechanism stability.
Differential privacy enables designing mechanisms in unrelated economic settings.
Abstract
This paper is a survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy. The connection is a natural one, but its study has been jump-started in recent years by the advent of differential privacy, which provides a rigorous, quantitative way of reasoning about the costs that an agent might experience because of the loss of his privacy. Here, we survey several facets of this study, and differential privacy plays a role in more than one way. Of course, it provides us a basis for modeling agent costs for privacy, which is essential if we are to attempt mechanism design in a setting in which agents have preferences for privacy. It also provides a toolkit for controlling those costs. However, perhaps more surprisingly, it provides a powerful toolkit for controlling the stability of mechanisms in general, which yields a set of tools for designing novel mechanisms even in…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Game Theory and Voting Systems
