Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system

TL;DR

This paper introduces a partially random phase attack that exploits imperfections in phase randomization in two-way quantum key distribution systems, revealing potential security vulnerabilities even with active phase randomization.

Contribution

It proposes a novel attack method demonstrating that phase randomization imperfections can compromise the security of practical two-way QKD systems.

Findings

Eve can break security despite active phase randomization

The attack is effective in certain parameter regimes

The attack can bypass the one-decoy-state method

Abstract

Phase randomization is a very important assumption in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (QKD) system with a weak coherent source. Thus an active phase modulator is needed to randomize the phase of source. However, it is hard to check whether the phase of source is randomized totally or not in practical QKD systems. In this paper a partially random phase attack is proposed to exploit this imperfection. Our analysis shows that Eve can break the security of a two-way QKD system by using our attack, even if an active phase randomization is adopted by Alice. Furthermore, the numerical simulation shows that in some parameter regimes, our attack is immune to the one-decoy-state method.