Dissipation attack on Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol in practical quantum key distribution system

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel dissipation-based attack on the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, demonstrating how an adversary can secretly gain information without detection in practical, lossy, and noisy quantum channels.

Contribution

It presents a new individual attack method leveraging dissipation, highlighting vulnerabilities in practical QKD systems with lossy and noisy channels.

Findings

Adversary can obtain significant information undetected.

Attack exploits loss and noise to disguise eavesdropping.

Practical QKD systems are vulnerable to this dissipation attack.

Abstract

We propose a new kind of individual attack, based on randomly selected dissipation, on Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system with lossy and noisy quantum channel. Since an adversary with super quantum channel can disguise loss and errors induced by his attack as that of the system, he can obtain innegligible amount of information for a practical QKD system, without being detected by legal participants.