A coercion-resistant protocol for conducting elections by telephone

TL;DR

This paper introduces a telephone-based voting protocol that resists coercion by making vote proof costly, promoting fair elections with increased voter participation, though it relies on a trusted authority for vote counting.

Contribution

The paper proposes a novel coercion-resistant voting protocol suitable for telephone elections, addressing security concerns and encouraging voter turnout.

Findings

Protocol effectively deters vote coercion and inducement.

Large electoral pools increase the cost of manipulation.

The approach offers cost savings and higher voter participation.

Abstract

We present a protocol that allows voters to phone in their votes. Our protocol makes it expensive for a candidate and a voter to cooperate to prove to the candidate who the voter voted for. When the electoral pool is large enough, the cost to the candidate of manipulating sufficiently many votes to have an influence on the election results becomes impossibly expensive. Hence, the protocol provides candidates no incentive to attempt inducement or coercion of voters, resulting in free and fair elections with the promise of cost savings and higher voter turnout over traditional elections. One major inadequacy with our suggested protocol is that we assume the existence of a trusted election authority to count the votes.