Evolution of Cooperation in an Incentive Based Business Game Environment
Sanat Kumar Bista, Keshav P Dahal, Peter I Cowling

TL;DR
This paper explores how incentive-based systems with reputation mechanisms promote cooperation and trustworthiness among players in online business environments, outperforming non-incentive approaches.
Contribution
It introduces a novel incentive-based reputation system that dynamically adjusts rewards and punishments based on transaction value and player history, enhancing cooperation.
Findings
Incentive-based systems foster more trustworthy behavior.
Reputation mechanisms improve cooperation compared to non-incentive environments.
Dynamic rewards and punishments effectively promote trustworthiness.
Abstract
This paper discusses our investigation into the evolution of cooperative players in an online business environment. We explain our design of an incentive based system with its foundation over binary reputation system whose proportion of reward or punishment is a function of transaction value and the players past history of cooperation. We compare the evolution of cooperation in our setting with non-incentive based environment and our findings show that the incentive based method is more suitable for the evolution of trustworthy players.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
