Small Support Equilibria in Large Games
Yakov Babichenko

TL;DR
This paper presents a simplified proof for the existence of small support approximate Nash equilibria in large games, improving bounds and extending results to n-player and graphical games.
Contribution
It offers a new, simpler proof that enhances bounds on support size and generalizes small probability game results to n-player and graphical games.
Findings
Improved support size bounds for approximate Nash equilibria in n-player games.
Extended small probability game results from two-player to n-player games.
Established logarithmic support bounds in graphical games.
Abstract
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions: 1. For n-player games, we improve the bound on the size of the support of an approximate Nash equilibrium. 2. We generalize the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou on small probability games from the two-player case to the general n-player case. 3. We provide a logarithmic bound on the size of the support of an approximate Nash equilibrium in the case of graphical games.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems
