Disappointment in Social Choice Protocols

TL;DR

This paper introduces the concept of social disappointment in social choice protocols, proposes protocols to prevent it, and proves an impossibility theorem related to this new criterion.

Contribution

It defines social disappointment as a new criterion in social choice theory, introduces protocols to avoid it, and establishes an impossibility theorem.

Findings

Protocols that prevent social disappointment are proposed.

An impossibility theorem related to social disappointment is proved.

The concept highlights limitations in existing social choice mechanisms.

Abstract

Social choice theory is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual preferences, interests, or welfare to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. We introduce a new criterion for social choice protocols called social disappointment. Social disappointment happens when the outcome of a voting system occurs for those alternatives which are at the end of at least half of individual preference profiles. Here we introduce some protocols that prevent social disappointment and prove an impossibility theorem based on this key concept.